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ABSTRACT 
The 2011 US Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) represents a major initiative to improve food safety. The 
legislation mandates the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with developing a regulatory system to implement 
the Act. Both domestic and foreign firms that wish to supply US consumers with food will face a considerable 
increase in regulatory costs. Implementation has proved challenging for the FDA leading to delays which increase 
investment risks for foreign suppliers, particulalry from developing countries. This paper sets out the major FSMA 
requirements and examines how the regulatory burden may fall on foreign versus US suppliers. 
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1 Introduction  
The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), signed by President Obama, on 4 January 2011, has been 
touted as the most significant update of US food safety laws since 1930s. The FSMA charges the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with protecting Americans  against food-borne diseases and 
illness. The FSMA sets out a wide ranging set of tasks, some with deadlines, which must be accomplished 
by the FDA to implement the Act. These have proved challenging for the FDA to accomplish leaving food 
companies, including foreign suppliers, with little clarity as to what a FSMA-based regulatory regime will 
entail or the investments it may require. After almost five years since the new Act became law, and 
important deadlines likely missed, the implementation dynamics of the FSMA warrants an examination to 
determine the implications for international supply chains, including those originating in the European 
Union (EU) wishing to move food products into the US. 
The spur for a stronger US regulatory regime for food safety arose from high-profile outbreaks of food-
borne illness that shook public confidence in the US food supply. For example, evidence of E. coli and 
Salmonella had been found in domestic and imported foods including spices, peanut butter, cookie dough, 
spinach, melons, hot peppers, tomatoes and green onions (Carte Pate and Leavitt Partners, 2010). The 
new regulations focus on better arming the FDA to protect consumers against food-borne problems 
associated with domestic and imported food.  Imports became a particular concern after widely publicised 
problems with food imported from China in 2007 (Liu et al., 2009). The US i mports food from over 150 
countries, and there is a widely held public perception that the food-safety standards of many countries 
from which imports are sourced are weak or that enforcement is lax. Issues with food quality (e.g. the 
substitution of horsemeat for beef in processed foods) and food safety are widely reported in the US 
press and on social media so that exporters having high standards such as the EU are not differentiated in 
the minds of consumers. 
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Imported food constitutes 15 percent of the US food supply, including 80 percent of the seafood and 
approximately 60 percent of the fresh produce that is consumed (Superville and Jalonick, 2011). The FSMA 
focuses on preventing food related problems rather than mitigating them. The Act covers about 80 
percent of all food consumed within the US, with the exception of meat, poultry and dairy, which is 
regulated separately by the US Department of Agriculture. The bill also includes exemptions fo r small food 
companies and farms. 
Governments have the obligation and the right to take act ions to protect their citizens from harm – 
including those that may arise from food consumption. A failure in the food safety system can be one of 
the most politically damaging events for policy makers. It does not matter whether the failure originated 
within the domestic market or outside the country, domestic politicians are likely held accountable by 
their citizens. As a result, ensuring the safety of the food supply is an area of policy making where 
sovereignty is closely guarded (Kerr and Hobbs, 2010).   Given improved detection technologies and 
changing risk environments, periodic changes to food safety regulatory regimes can be expected. 
Regulatory changes are likely to increase the costs for firms involved in food supply chains. If those cost 
increases fall disproportionately upon some participants in agri-food supply chains their competitiveness 
can be expected to deteriorate. The commitments made under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Agreement on the Applications of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), however, stipulates that 
changes in regulations should not impose costs in such a way that they disadvantage foreign producers 
relative to domestic producers (Isaac, 2007). Further, even if all foreign firms are treated the same, the 
ability of firms and supply chains to adapt to the new requirements may differ so that the relative 
competitiveness of some country’s firms will improve while others’ deteriorate. Increases in import 
standards, new procedures and more complex regulations are expected to increase costs 
disproportionally for firms in developing countries because they have less capacity to deal with the 
changes (Khorana et al., 2010). On the other hand, for jurisdictions that already have high standards, and 
thus high costs, such as the EU meeting a second set of similarly high, but different standards, may impose 
considerable costs on firms and supply chains.  
The interaction between regulation and international competitiveness for food safety is complex. Many of 
the increased costs relate to monitoring activities that are often subsumed in the general administrative 
costs of a firm – and thus cannot easily be separated out (Hobbs and Young, 2000). They represent calls 
on the time of individuals. Bottlenecks may materialize in the process of meeting a new standard – lack of 
certified facilities, delays in regulators putting in place sufficient staff to undertake new aspects of their 
regulatory oversight, the need to train staff in testing laboratories, etc. These bottlenecks in the food  
system can be temporary transitional impediments to competitiveness or ongoing constraints that 
negatively affect trade flows. They are open to political interference through a government’s budgetary 
process and, hence, are susceptible to capture by those who seek economic protection. In many cases it is 
not yet possible to fully assess the FSMA’s effect on competitiveness because the administrative details 
have yet to be worked out by the FDA – despite some timetables for implementation having been 
mandated in the legislation. It is possible, however, to point out potential areas where bottlenecks may 
exist in the future and/or where the application of the FSMA is likely to violate WTO commitments. 
Countries with little WTO experience – often developing countries – will have to learn when an importer’s 
regulations can be challenged and how a successful challenge can be mounted. Even for European firms 
which have long history of international dealings, there can be a costly period of learning -by-doing 
associated with mounting a challenge to new regulations. 
In the next section the main requirements of the FSMA are summarized. This is followed by a discussion of 
the dynamics of implementing the extensive changes mandated in the legislation governing the FSMA 
and, in particular, the mismatch between the resources available and the task the regulators have been 
tasked with. The focus is on those aspects of the FSMA that will affect foreign suppliers and the difficulties 
the delays in implementation cause for foreign firms. The next section examines the FSMA in the context 
of the international commitments made by the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) to determine 
any areas open to an international challenge. The final sections provides conclusions.   
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2 The US Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 
The FMSA became law in January 2011 but a considerable grace period for implementation was granted as 
the FDA and other US regulatory agencies needed to develop new protocols and procedures, train staff 
and inform both domestic and foreign-origin food supply chain participants what compliance will entail. 
Under the FSMA the FDA will have new prevention-focused tools and a clear regulatory framework to help 
make substantial improvements in their approach to food safety (FDA, n.d.).
 
The following are the key 
policy changes in the new FSMA that may have potential implications for those trading foodstuffs into or 
out of the US. It should be remembered that the FSMA does not regulate meat, poultry and dairy 
products.  Alcoholic beverages, dietary supplements, and seafood are, however, newly covered in the Act.  
 The foreign supplier verification program: The FDA has been given the power to require import certification 
that attests that imported food was produced in compliance with US laws and regulations. US importers 
will be required to verify the activities of their foreign suppliers, ensuring their suppliers produce foods 
that comply with: 1) hazard analysis and preventative controls (HACCP); or, 2) with production and 
harvesting standards. A foreign supplier located must also provide assurances that their products are not 
adulterated or misbranded. The FDA is to provide new regulations to define the required verification 
methods. Food processors, and in many cases farmers, will have to learn about and understand these 
verification methods if they wish to continue exporting to the US or to expand into the US market. The FDA 
will determine requirements based on the known risks associated with the food or its geographic origin. 
Food without proper foreign supplier verification and importing food without a verification program in 
place may result in import prohibitions or criminal prosecution. Food production facilities must inform the 
FDA, in writing, of all identified hazardous practices that exist along their supply chains and their plans to 
implement preventive measures. The FDA, along with the US Department of Homeland Security and US 
Department of Agriculture, are to devise regulations that prevent food companies from knowingly 
including illegal additives, chemicals or other substances in their food products. Even firms operating in 
countries that have mandatory HACCP systems, such as the EU, will have to ensure both that their current 
systems meet FSMA protocols (i.e. HACCP systems may vary across countries) and have their activities in 
this area verified.  
 Mandatory food recalls: The FMSA gives the FDA the power to directly order a mandatory food recall or to 
seize and detain food if there is a reasonable probability that the product is adulterated or misbranded and 
could cause serious adverse health consequences. Previously, recalls were voluntary with the decision lying 
with the firm. It is hoped that the threat of FDA action will induce more firms to undertake voluntary 
recalls expeditiously.  
 Shut down of production: The FMSA gives the FDA the ability to temporarily shut down a food production 
facility if a possible health risk is suspected. The FDA is granted expanded access to food production facility 
records. It may formally request access to a firm’s records if there is reason to suspect a potential public 
health risk or for tracking purposes.   
 The frequency of inspection: The frequency of inspections by the FDA is supposed to increase. Those 
facilities designated as ‘High Risk’ must be inspected every three years. Those designated as ‘Low Risk’ 
must be inspected within seven years. Both foreign and domestic facilities must be inspected. By 2011, the 
FDA was mandated to inspect no fewer than 600 foreign facilities and inspections of foreign food facilities 
were then to double each year over the next five years. When fully implemented, inspection of foreign 
facilities must take place twice a year. Thus, food processing facilities in the EU must prepare for 
inspections twice a year. Further, in an effort to improve food safety oversight, FDA offices are to be 
established in at least five foreign countries that export food to the US. The EU is unlikely to be high on the 
list of areas to have an FDA office as food safety issues are more prominent in some developing countries. 
As a result, the ability to deal with a food safety issue may be delayed relative to firms in countries that 
have a FDA office. The FDA will have the authority to review the current food safety practices of countries 
that wish to supply the US market – and the foreign governments must prepare the required information 
and cooperate with the FDA if it wishes to maintain and expand food product exports to the US. The US 
Secretary of Health and Human Services is tasked with working with foreign governments to streamline the 
inspection of foreign facilities.  
 Standards for on-farm production and harvesting: Science-based mandatory standards for producing and 
harvesting fresh produce are to be established by the FDA. Thus, farmers in EU and other foreign countries 
may have to alter their production methods to be able to access the US market. Further, for some specified 
vegetables and fruits as well as produce which are designated as being ‘High Risk’  designated raw 
agricultural commodities   the FDA is to publish safety guidelines. The Act also requires the FDA to 
identify the most significant food threats  food-borne contaminants and diseases  every two years.  
 Post-harvest supply chains: Specific response and recovery procedures are to be developed to deal with 
outbreaks of food-borne illness by Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Department of 
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Homeland Security. Retailers in the US will have frontline responsibility for pro-actively alerting customers 
regarding product recalls.  
 Effective traceability: In coordination with the fruit and vegetable industries, the FDA is to create a new 
method of effectively tracking and tracing fresh produce.  
 Laboratory accreditation: By early 2013, the FDA was mandated to develop a mechanism to accredit 
laboratories for food safety testing. The mechanism is to have model standards that include sampling and 
analytical procedures, internal quality controls and training for individuals carrying out the collection of a 
sample and subsequent analysis. The goal is to increase the number of laboratories that qualify. Foreign 
laboratories are eligible for participation if they achieve the model standards. Laboratories were supposed 
to be required to be accredited to conduct any regulatory testing by mid-2013. Foreign governments must 
weigh the costs of having their own certified laboratories or relying on certified foreign laboratories. This 
may be a difficult choice for the EU Commission and other foreign governments. With perishable food 
products, the time that testing takes is important to prevent deterioration of shipment’s quality. 
 Third-party auditors: The FSMA requires that the FDA establish a means to recognize accreditation bodies 
and third-party auditors. Third-parties can be a foreign government, a private firm or a non-government 
organization (NGO). Third-party audit certifications will be used to ensure that an imported product 
complies with US laws and regulations. National governments in the EU must decide which form of 
institution will provide the most effective certification for its food supply chains. 
 Mandatory registration: A new twice yearly registration procedure is to be put in place and firms must 
attain compliance with updated requirements or risk suspension. Food facility registrations will need to be 
renewed every two years. The FDA has the ability to suspend a registration meaning it would be impossible 
to import food into the US from such facility. A suspended US facility would not be able to export. 
 Agriculture and food products transportation: Regulations regarding sanitary practices in transportation 
are to be developed by the FDA. Shippers (including those using ships, motor vehicles, railway goods 
wagons or aircraft), receivers, and others engaged in transportation of food will be required to implement 
the practices. If these differ from existing EU regulations, firms may find it costly to satisfy both sets of 
sanitary practices. 
 Pre-screening to expedite imports: The FDA is to enable a voluntary qualified importer program for firms 
desiring expedited import procedures for food. Importing firms participating in this program are required 
to have certifications from an accredited third-party auditor. High risk foods or foods from high risk 
countries, at FDA’s discretion, may have additional requirements specified. Firms in foreign countries must 
decide whether they wish to participate in pre-screening programs. EU firms, given their existing high 
standards, may have an advantage in qualifying for pre-screening relative to firms in developing countries.   
 The burden of costs and incentives: The FDA may collect fees to offset importer re-inspection related costs 
and for administering the qualified importer program. Firms that require re-inspection or recall may be 
subject to a fee established by the FDA. 
Taken together this represents a massive undertaking for the FDA and it has struggled to implement it. It 
requires a large number of specially qualified personnel to develop the wide ranging array of regulations 
and to engage in the ongoing monitoring programs. The FDA has struggled to find sufficient personnel. 
While US$1.4 billion was budgeted for implementation, it has proved insufficient. 
The regulation exempts small US producers from recordkeeping and hazard analysis requirements. Small 
scale producers are defined to cover a category of producers who sell directly to distributors and whose 
annual sales are less than US$500,000. This exemption may be revoked if, in future, food related problems 
are linked to small scale producers (Superville and Jalonick, 2011). The exemption does not apply to small 
scale foreign suppliers, including those in the EU. This will disadvantage firms attempting to develop niche 
markets in the US. 
3 The Dynamics of Implementing the FSMA 
Given the agenda set out in the FSMA outlined above it is obvious that the task faced by the FDA is 
enormous. Developing the regulatory systems for food is a complex task requiring expertise from a host of 
disciplines from those with a basis in science to social scientists that understand compliance costs and the 
role of incentives to those with legal training to others with a specialization in education. It takes time. 
The FDA is struggling with implementation. A speech by Michael Taylor, Deputy Commissioner for Foods 
and Veterinary Medicines, FDA to the World Food Safety and Security Forum hosted at the Milan EXPO in 
September 2015 is instructive. Mr. Taylor (2015) stated: 
One of the biggest food safety challenges we all face, however, is how to provide the level 
of verification that is needed for food safety and consumer confidence in a world of 
expanding scale and diversity of international trade in food, coupled with always finite and 
often scarce resources available for food safety. … 
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Systems recognition is based on a rigorous assessment by FDA that another country has a 
food safety system that is comparable to ours in its capacity and effectiveness in assuring 
good food safety outcomes.  … 
 
So far we have entered into a systems recognition agreement with New Zealand …  We are 
in late stages of assessments and development of mutual recognition agreements with 
Australia and Canada, and we have begun the assessment dialogue with our counterparts 
at the European Commission. 
 
As outlined above the FSMA mandates a system for foreign supplier verification. As yet, this system does 
not exist. The FDA has taken five years to develop a system for recognition agreements, which are only a 
step in the process of establishing regulatory thresholds for market access. As indicated in the quote 
above it has only concluded one recognition agreement with two formally in process of development. 
These are all with countries with high levels of food safety. Discussions have just begun with the EU – a 
major trading partner with high food safety standards. In a world where in excess of 150 countries supply 
the US with food, FDA compliance with the FSMA appears painfully slow. No developing countries are yet 
in the set of countries where the process has even begun. Where does this leave firms in the EU or other 
countries where nothing has been concluded. What investments in food safety should they make? The 
lack of progress increases the level of risk associated with engaging in supplying food products to the US. 
This slowness in progress on just this one facet of the FDA’s responsibilities encompassed in the FSMA 
underlines the scale of the implementation process – the FDA is likely doing the best it can given the 
available resources. 
In his testimony regarding resourcing implementation of the FSMA before the US Congress 
in 2014 Mr. Taylor stated: 
The determination that we have all made to improve the safety of our food supply 
requires two fundamental steps.  The first was to give FDA the mandate and tools to 
modernize the food safety system, and I applaud you for doing that via the enactment of 
FSMA.  The second is to give FDA the capacity to carry out the numerous changes 
embodied in the law.  It is that challenge that we must continue to address.  Simply put, 
we cannot achieve our objective of a safer food supply without a significant increase in 
resources…. 
Without adequate funding, FDA will be unable to adequately fulfill its oversight 
responsibilities.  This includes implementing the Foreign Supplier Verification Program, 
which requires new staff and skills to audit and verify the adequacy of the importer’s 
verification plan; conducting more foreign inspections; working more closely on food 
safety with foreign governments to leverage their efforts; and improving our data and 
import systems to facilitate prompt entry of foods that meet our safety standards. … But 
we cannot meet this need without the resources it takes to build the new import system. 
 
Simply put, the FDA is under resourced relative to its new responsibility leading to considerable delays in 
implementation with the result that the regulatory future is opaque, the international trade environments 
is riskier and investment in exporting food products to the US inhibited. Thus, the dynamics of 
implementation add an additional dimension to the new food systems required of foreign suppliers in the 
FSMA. The implications of this implementation dynamic will be incorporated in the assessment of the 
FSMA for foreign suppliers in what follows. The absence of deta ils regarding even the rough outlines of 
the new regulatory system means that assessments of, for example, the potential increase in costs 
associated with compliance means that even the most basic planning cannot be undertaken by existing 
exporting firms from the EU or potential exporting firms that can identify markets of interest in the US.  
4 What are the implications of the FSMA for food exporters to the US?  
It is not possible to provide a complete assessment of the effect of the FSMA on the competitive ness of 
the foreign origin supply chains because full implementation will likely be considerably delayed – and this 
is assuming the FDA can actually achieve the targets for the development of systems, procedures and 
trained personnel set out in the legislation. The latter cannot be assumed – for example, it took years for 
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the much less ambitious and simpler US country of origin labelling of imported food to be fully 
implemented (Sawka and Kerr, 2010). Much of what ultimately affects exporters’ competitivene ss will 
arise from future regulations developed by the FDA. Exporters need to remain vigilant as the new US 
regulatory environment pertaining to food safety unfolds.  
Exporters of agri-food produce and products to the US and US domestic importers will eventually be 
subject to much closer scrutiny of their food safety controls under the FSMA. This applies equally to all 
foreign suppliers of the US, including those from jurisdictions with high food safety standards such as the 
EU. The legislation has raised the bar for entry of agri-food products into the US by imposing additional 
minimum requirements. Importing firms will be accountable for food safety due to the new importer 
verification requirements and this, in turn, implies that foreign suppliers will be directly responsible for 
complying with the new regulations when they are eventually developed. As with their US counterparts, 
EU suppliers will have to comply with registration requirements, increased FDA requests for access to 
records, undertake hazard analysis in ways specified by the FDA, implement preventive controls and 
performance standards, put in place product tracking systems and engage in increased recordkeeping 
activities. While these processes are already done by firms in the EU to meet domesti c standards, there is 
no assurance that these will be sufficient for compliance with US requirements. The US is devising 
regulations both for domestic production and management of supply chains as well as those for more 
than 150 countries. There is no assurance that these will be compatible with those that already exist in 
the EU. 
Mitigation strategies for intentional adulteration must be put in place by firms but, as yet, these have not 
been developed. All these can raise the cost of sourcing in the EU and other foreign countries if the 
process of obtaining a verification certificate proves costly, lengthy or complex. While costs will 
undoubtedly rise, they will also rise for US firms. It may well be that firms in advanced markets like the EU 
may be better able to meet US standards than firms located in developing countries – something that 
could provide them with a competitive advantage. Without details, however, the required assessments 
cannot be undertaken to allow any new avenues of increased competitiveness to be planned for. 
The FDA will henceforth require imported food to be certified to ensure compliance with US laws. This will 
require exporting firms in the EU to identify the appropriate US laws and then to make the changes 
necessary to come into compliance. Subsequently, certification will have to be arranged. If the firm fails to 
obtain certification, exports may be disrupted until the problem is identified and rectified. Entry into the 
US may be delayed until certification is obtained. Certification may be delayed due to a shortage of 
certifiers. In case of perishable products, such as fresh fruits and vegetables, a delay in obtaining 
certification can lead to deterioration in the quality of the products awaiting export. The FDA is to, but has 
not yet provided regulations regarding how a firm can verify that food has not been adulterated or 
misbranded. In this case, the exporting industry may incur additional cost if they have to install equipment 
for verification of food safety, such as equipment for testing for contamination or chemical residues. Until 
the regulations are developed investments in these systems must be held in abeyance. Those wishing to 
export to the US will also need to provide training for employees or hire skilled workers to undertake 
verification and testing procedures. If products have to be transported to some other place for testing 
additional transportation costs will be incurred. 
The legislation requires the FDA to develop a program for accrediting testing laboratories. Given  the wide 
ranging increase in monitoring embedded in the FSMA, there is likely to be an increased demand for food 
safety related testing. Existing laboratories in many exporting countries will have to expand and 
investments in new laboratories will likely be warranted. If the new testing procedures differ from existing 
methods in the EU new investments may also be required. This is a clear area for potential bottlenecks. 
Delays in developing the accreditation program increase the likelihood of delays for ex port supply chains. 
In many cases, certification will involve both evaluation of laboratory infrastructure and the training of 
laboratory staff. Investments in expanded and new laboratories will have to await the release of the new 
FDA accreditation program and what the process will entail. Similarly, the training/upgrading of staff skills 
will have to await the release of the FDA accreditation standards. What is not clear is how the ability to 
export will be affected in the time between the date of the FDA establishing a program and the time it 
takes to comply. Accreditation will take time, particularly if facilities have to be upgraded or staff 
retrained. Putting in place an accreditation program itself will require either evaluation by FDA personnel 
or the development of third party certification institutions. FDA personnel are likely to be stretched by the 
demand for certification leading to queuing delays. Alternatively, the establishment of a third party 
system will require the development of a regulatory regime to oversee that industry. It is not clear 
whether firms will be able to ship to the US while constraints on the accreditation of laboratories exist. 
Further, those laboratories that manage to garner accreditation early in the process may be able to 
extract rents in terms of testing fees while laboratory capacity constraints exist. In short, a great deal of 
uncertainty exists. 
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A similar problem relates to the establishment of a third party audit system. The intent of the new audit 
system is to ensure that all parties in supply chains are conforming to US laws. It is not clear how onerous 
such audits will be for firms along the supply chains. The costs involved could be substantial. In any case, 
this will be a major undertaking and require the expansion of existing accredited third party auditing firms 
and/or the establishment and accreditation of new third party audit firms. Again, there is considerable 
potential for bottlenecks to develop. 
This auditing of firms for compliance with US laws and regulations all along the supply chain may provide 
an incentive for transaction cost reducing vertical integration – a reduction in monitoring costs through a 
reduced number of audits (Hobbs and Kerr, 1992). Even if full vertical integration is not the result, the 
requirement for auditing may work to the detriment of small firms that may be excluded from audited 
supply chains given the fixed costs of auditing. 
Exporting firms must also register with the FDA. Registrations will have to be renewed twice a year. Th is 
requirement may work against intermittent or opportunistic exporters that currently exploit international 
market arbitrage rather than engaging in sustained exporting. As they cannot predict when arbitrage 
opportunities will arise they may choose not to consistently register.  
The FSMA mandates the use of US recognized HACCP by foreign firms. While HACCP is widely used, there 
is no international harmonization of HACCP systems (Kerr, 2000). If the FDA insists on the use of HACCP 
systems that comply with US standards, EU firms may have to alter their practices and be forced to 
simultaneously use a domestic system and a US system. Resources constraint issues may again come to 
the fore as there will be the need for US recognized HACCP trainers and certifiers which currently do not 
exist outside the US. Further, a system for certification and audit of the HACCP systems used by firms 
wishing to export to the US will have to be established. The more that the EU Commission and the 
European Food Safety Authority can negotiate for EU mechanisms to be granted equivalence to those 
being developed in the US, the less costly will be compliance for EU exporters. This should be a priority in 
discussions with the US. 
The FSMA requires traceability of imported food products.  For many industries, and particularly for fresh 
produce, where inputs are sourced from many suppliers, maintaining the complete  information on the 
place of origin and supply chain movements of a product and linking a product’s history with its eventual  
distribution is a daunting task, particularly in developing countries. The US has been a laggard in 
traceability initiatives (Brocklebank et al., 2008) relative to, for example, the European Union. While 
traceability is simple in concept – and thus politically popular – it is difficult and costly in practice. Thus, 
mandating traceability in the US may result in considerable costs being lumbered onto both US industries 
and international suppliers. Again, given the extensive use of traceability systems in the E U, this is an 
obvious area where EU authorities should push for the granting of equivalence.  
One can expect considerable ‘push back’ from the domestic industry in the US if the post -BSE  bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy  experience with the US beef industry is at all representative (Loppacher and 
Kerr, 2005). If there is a softening of the traceability requirement, exporters to the US should be vigilant 
to ensure that such changes are not made in ways that disadvantage foreign suppliers.  
It is not clear whether the FDA’s mandate to require recall of products can extend to foreign suppliers. At 
the very least, suspect foreign products will now be open to seizure and detention. Given the provisions 
for mandatory registration, foreign suppliers that did not comply with a FDA mandatory recall would likely 
quickly have its registration cancelled effectively ending its ability to export. Hence, one is likely to 
observe compliance with recall requests.  
The inspection of foreign facilities mandated in the FSMA is an enormous task given the number of 
countries that currently supply the US and the complexity of international supply chains. All foreign 
facilities are to be inspected every two years. As yet, there is no indication who will be undertaking the 
inspections. Whether it is FDA personnel or third parties that will undertake the inspections, it will require 
a large number of trained inspectors. Inspections add new facets to exporting including inconsistency 
among inspectors, opportunities for corruption and political interference in the rigor with which 
inspections are undertaken (Bruce and Kerr, 1986; Kerr, et al., 1986). The FSMA gives the right to the FDA 
to shut down a facility if it suspects a food safety risk. Beyond the questions raised regarding the 
legitimacy of extraterritoriality, this is not a particularly contentious issue. The contentious issue may 
become, however, under what circumstances a facility will again be able to begin exporting to the US. 
Those charged with protecting the market from unsafe food have little interest in when exports can 
actually resume. The Canadian experience with the ability of US-based interest groups to delay the re-
opening of the US border in the wake of the discovery of BSE in Canada and the subsequent border 
closure provides an insightful lesson (Loppacher and Kerr, 2005). 
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The FDA must establish production and harvesting standards for fresh produce. Agronomic conditions vary 
greatly and can be localized to a considerable degree. Thus, standards established for US cond itions may 
not be optimal for production and harvesting in all circumstances. As a result, exports may be denied 
market access or compliance costs may be higher for suppliers in the EU. Again, establishing such 
standards for a wide variety of products will require a considerable resource commitment by the FDA. As 
yet, there appears to be little progress toward implementation in this area. It is clearly an area where the 
ambitions of legislators outstrip the capacity of the regulator.  
The requirements for transporting food may require investments in new shipping equipment and other 
related facilities. While this may represent a considerable expense for foreign firms, the same costs will be 
borne by US firms. To reach the new transportation standards may be much more difficult for suppliers 
from developing countries relative to those in the EU given the generally poor state of infrastructure in 
many of those countries.  
In general, the FSMA sets out a very ambitious agenda for the FDA under very short timeline s. While it is 
hard to judge if the resources made available to the FDA will be sufficient for it to undertake what it has 
been charged with, it will also require considerable numbers of trained and relatively specialized people. 
There is unlikely a pool of such individuals for the FDA to draw upon so compromises will have to be made 
either on the quality of the people implementing the program or in the timelines.  Less than fully trained 
personnel will be more prone to make mistakes – mistakes that can be costly for exporting firms. Delays in 
implementation play havoc with the investment that will have to be made for EU firms to continue to 
access the US market. Firms that wish to export to the US will have to be vigilant as there will be a host of 
FDA regulations that will be rolled out over the next few years. 
5 The FSMA and international trade commitments 
The FSMA provisions fall largely under the commitments that the US has made under the WTO’s SPS 
agreement. Central to those commitments is the Principle of Non-discrimination. There are two elements 
of Non-discrimination – Most Favored Nation and National Treatment. National Treatment is what is 
applicable in the case of the FSMA. National Treatment commits a country not to impose SPS -based 
regulations that treat foreign suppliers differently than domestic suppliers. The FSMA would appear to 
violate US National Treatment commitments in a number of ways. 
The requirement that foreign facilities be inspected twice a year when ‘High Risk’ facilities in the US are 
only inspected once every three years and US ‘Low Risk’ facilities will be inspected within seven years is 
clearly discriminatory. There is a presumption that foreign facilities are riskier than US facilities – in fact 
EU facilities may represent less risk given stringent EU regulations. Inspections will, however, still have to 
be undertaken. Given that inspections will likely impose considerable costs, this provision endows US 
producers with a competitive advantage over foreign suppliers. Countries can  impose higher standards if 
there is scientific evidence or evidence of an increased risk. It is unlikely that the US could prove that 
foreign facilities in the EU represent a greater food safety risk than domestic facilities to the satisfaction 
of a WTO Disputes Panel. This provision of the FSMA could be challenged at the WTO.  
A potential source of inconsistency of the regulation with WTO rules is the exemption of small scale US 
producers from HACCP requirements. This exemption has not been extended to for eign small scale 
suppliers. From a food safety perspective, this exemption is hard to understand. Scientifically, there is no 
evidence attributing food-borne complications to large scale supply chains or imported products. It does 
recognize the disproportionate burden HACCP and traceability would place on small agri -food companies 
and farms. That the exemption has not been extended to foreign suppliers could be challenged as a 
violation of National Treatment at the WTO. The exemption in the US is, however, only for firms supplying 
locally (however defined). Hence, the trade effects may be small.   
As the FDA develops its regulations, there may be other areas where National Treatment is violated. In 
particular, the requirements for inspection, certification, tracing and auditing should be monitored 
carefully by EU authorities for requirements that are stricter for foreign suppliers than domestic firms. 
The FDA is also allowed to impose fees to recover the costs of inspections, etc. These fees could be 
charged in ways that could discriminate against EU suppliers.  
The FDA is to develop production and harvesting standards for fresh produce. If foreign firms are judged 
to not be complying with these standards, they will not be allowed to export to the US. Trade bar riers are 
not allowed to be put in place on the basis of production and processing methods (PPMs). If foreign food 
meets scientifically-based food safety requirements – as they do in the EU – they should not be excluded 
from the US market based on the production or harvesting methods used.  Mandating the use of an 
exclusive US HACCP standards might also be considered a PPM. 
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6 Conclusion 
The FSMA represents a major attempt at strengthening the safety of food consumed in the US. While one 
might question the efficacy of the changes in delivering greater food safety, the intent is clear. Once 
implemented, it could increase the trust of US consumers in EU food products leading to opportunities for 
market expansion. What is not clear, as yet, is what regulatory compliance will cost. It would appear that 
it will be a considerable burden for supply chains in the food industry. Both US and foreign firms will have 
to bear that cost if they wish to continue to supply the US market.  
The effect on competiveness is a relative concept. If costs were borne equally by all suppliers of food to 
the US market there would be no change in competitiveness. If the burden falls unequally, this will lead to 
changes in competitiveness. If costs fall unequally on EU and other foreign suppliers then they will lose 
markets to US suppliers. Except in a few cases – inspections and small scale producers – as yet there is 
little evidence of overt discrimination against foreign suppliers. It is, however, early days as the FDA has 
yet to develop a host of new FSMA regulations. These must be assessed as to whether they discriminate in 
favour of US supply chains. 
It is also clear that the costs of the FSMA will fall on US exporters. Import competing firms outside the US 
that compete in the international market will not be lumbered with these costs. Thus, the 
competitiveness of US exporters should decrease. Some EU firms should be able to capitalize on this 
opportunity. 
The FSMA appears to be a major undertaking with a very large responsibility place d on the FDA. 
Bottlenecks to exporting are bound to appear which will be very frustrating for EU firms. Private industry 
in EU should avail themselves of any opportunities provided by the FDA to have input into the 
implementation of the FSMA and EU authorities need to proactively monitor implementation to ensure it 
complies with US international obligations at the WTO. Food systems can adapt to major regulatory 
changes but the dynamic forces arising in the process of implementation can complicate adjustment  and 
increase its costs.   
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